ASEAN’S ROLE IN RESPONDING CYCLONE NARGIS DISASTER : A REVIEW ON ASEAN WAY

Introduction
In its 42 years old, The Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) is now acknowledged to be the most successful and durable regional cooperation in Asia and Pacific. One of the fundamental components supported the success and the existence of this organization, argues by Shaun Narine, is its pattern of diplomacy -further to be known as the “ASEAN Way”. Historically, ASEAN has developed the ASEAN Way based on the great diversities among its member, and also the motivation to create a stable intramural environment. In this context, conflicts are dealt with by postponing difficult issues, compartmentalizing an issue so that it does not interfere with other areas of cooperation, and quiet diplomacy. This is how ASEAN Way defined and used by ASEAN to achieve this goal center and indirect approaches to conflictual situations. Furthermore, the ASEAN Way has been embedded in the way ASEAN manage problems and develop its area of cooperation.

Despite its contribution to the successfulness of ASEAN, however, critics and doubts over ASEAN Way has been addressed to this organization due to its impact on the slow-cautious approach and loose arrangements that ASEAN always use when dealing with problems or issues. The cyclone Nargis that strucked Myanmar in 2008, to certain extent, has emerged critics and doubts over ASEAN’s role in responding this problem. At least there are two main opinion here: first, those who viewed that ASEAN had succeeded in negotiating and ensuring humanitarian access to cyclone-affected areas in the country, and second, those who viewed it as a failure of ASEAN to taken part effectively in the Nargis disaster. The argument is clear: despite the fact that Myanmar is a member of ASEAN, however, ASEAN could not force the government to open the country for international assistance for the reason of distrust of external interference.

Having said that, this paper will examine the role of ASEAN in responding cyclone Nargis disaster which strucked Myanmar in 2008. The paper will be focusing on the relevance and the effectiveness of ASEAN Way which entrenched in the way ASEAN dealing with Nargis disaster. As a part of ASEAN functional cooperation in disaster management, it is important to look at ASEAN’s response in this matter, since natural disaster such as Cyclone Nargis are likely to become increasingly frequent, and expertise in responding to and managing them will be needed in the future.

ASEAN’s Role on Nargis Disaster : A Test For ASEAN?
The cyclone Nargis that strucked Myanmar on 2 and 3 May 2008 has caused widespread devastation in the Ayeyarwady and Yangon Divisions. Based on the Humanitarian Appeal report, the scale of human loss and suffering was vast. The latest official figures reported that nearly 140,000 persons are either dead or “missing” (more precisely 84,537 killed, 53,836 still unaccounted for); and nearly 20,000 have been injured. Some 2.4 million people are thought to be severely affected (in the sense of loss of livelihoods, shelter, or similarly severe loss) – equivalent to more than a third of the population of 7.3 million in the affected Townships – with up to 800,000 people displaced from their homes.

Nargis was the worst natural disaster in the history of Myanmar, and possibly the most devastating cyclone to hit Asia since the cyclone that struck Bangladesh in 1991. The impact on the Ayeyarwady Delta -a remote area, heavily populated and difficult to access-, was particularly severe. In addition to the lives and livelihoods lost, the timing and extent of the natural disaster greatly affected the critical planting season in what is Myanmar’s breadbasket region, with significant quantities of seeds and harvested crops lost.

The cyclone Nargis disaster had also brought more critics to Myanmar government, which considered failed to provide prompt and immediate response to the victims of cyclone Nargis and the tidal surge. As noted by Belanger and Horsey, before the cyclone struck, the interim UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator made a formal offer of assistance to the Myanmar authorities, underlining that there would be a need for immediate access to any affected areas in order to undertake an assessment of needs. The Myanmar authorities indicated informally as early as 4 May that they would be open to international assistance, and this position was formalized in a briefing to the UN and diplomats on 5 May.

However, at that point the emphasis was clearly on support to the national response through bilateral channels, rather than any form of international relief operation. There were no immediate steps were taken by the authorities to facilitate the issuing of visas for international humanitarian staff, or to relax the cumbersome procedures governing travel by internationals outside of Yangon. Even though the international community did immediately offer assistance to people of Burma, the Myanmar government has generally denied access to open the country and let foreign aid and assistance in helping the victims. The junta refused to issue visas for emergency relief workers, and this has impeded the flow of aid into the country to the victims of the calamity. In brief, one can say that Myanmar authorities were initially reluctant to provide the necessary access to international humanitarian agencies.

According to Belanger, there are four factors that are likely contributed to the reluctance of Myanmar government. First, the self reliance doctrine, whereby the government reinforced the doctrine that the country and its people must take care of themselves and eschew any kind of outside assistance. Second, limited familiarity with international disaster response, whereby the Myanmar government at various level, were unfamiliar with what an international response entailed. Third, the domestic political context. This factor refers to the fact that in the wake of the cyclone, Myanmar government was focused more on political and security concerns. Fourth, the international environment, whereby the senior leadership is also suspicious of the motives behind international humanitarian assistance, which it tends to view as an instrument used by the West in pursuit of its political agenda.

In addition, such critics were also addressed to ASEAN, as an organization in which Myanmar become a member state. Action Network for Migrants Thailand, for instance, through their media statement declared that ASEAN has failed to do enough to effectively fulfill its responsibility to the people of ASEAN and the victims of this natural disaster in the Irrawaddy delta. Being the body of governments representing the people of ASEAN, it has the duty and responsibility to protect lives and “the high quality of life of its people”, as stated in its charter. Thus, ASEAN has responsibility to protect people’s life in the region, including Burmese people in Myanmar. Although ASEAN has in the past been strongly criticized for its position on and relationship with Myanmar -in particular for its policies of ‘non-interference’ and ‘constructive engagement’, the cyclone Nargis had became a test for ASEAN to answer the doubts over ASEAN’s effective role in the region. Hence, in the sense that ASEAN has responsibility to protect lives, it is also responsible for the loss of life and the additional sufferings brought about by the actions of Myanmar government that prevented necessary aid and assistant reaching the victims of cyclone Nargis.

On the contrary, the Secretary General of ASEAN, Surin Pitsuwan, claimed that the cyclone Nargis that whipped Myanmar has made ASEAN stronger, and gave the grouping "a sense of community and confidence". Referring to the successfulness of ASEAN in leading the international humanitarian effort to help millions of cyclone victims, he argues that it was actually shown to the world that ASEAN is an effective organization. Moreover, Pitsuwan insisted that in responding to the cyclone Nargis disaster management, ASEAN became the only mechanism for getting aid to the worst-hit areas.

The significance of ASEAN’s role in Nargis disaster, as claimed by Pitsuwan, was referring to ASEAN quick response in providing necessary assistance. Just after the cyclone struck, Pitsuwan called on all member states to provide urgent relief assistance through the framework of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). Three days later, on 8 May, the Myanmar government agreed to work in coordination with the ASEAN Secretariat to assemble and deploy an ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT), made up of government officials, disaster management experts and NGOs from member countries. In the first-ever such mission for ASEAN, ERAT was deployed to Myanmar from 9–18 May. Its report was submitted to a Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 19 May. At the meeting, ministers agreed to establish an ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism to 'facilitate the effective distribution and utilization of assistance from the international community, including the expeditious and effective deployment of relief workers, especially health and medical personnel'. Furthermore, ASEAN has also established two-tiered structure, consisting of a diplomatic body, the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force (AHTF), and a Yangon-based Tripartite Core Group (TCG), consisting of ASEAN, the Myanmar government and the United Nations, to facilitate day-to-day operations. Besides, a sense of community and solidarity also shown by the prompt action from rice exporting countries in ASEAN when they provided rice for the victims in affected area of cyclone Nargis through the coordination of ASEAN. Hence, Pitsuwan insisted that it actually shown how ASEAN did responsive action over the cyclone Nargis disaster.

Nonetheless, it is difficult to say with certainty whether ASEAN was indeed reached successful role in leading relief assistance in Myanmar. The fact that there are numerous critics remain might raise question and doubts over ASEAN’s effective role in this matter.

Success or Failure?
Although the important role of ASEAN in responding the cyclone Nargis disaster is to be recognized, however, a number of important points are worth noting. First, the deployment of ASEAN-ERAT to Myanmar, under the ASEAN Standby Arrangements and Standard Operating Procedure (SASOP) for disaster emergency response operations, was the first-ever experience for ASEAN. Thus, the lack of experience became a test for ASEAN’s capacity in cyclone Nargis disaster management. Second, the TCG was also challenging difficulties in dealing with Myanmar authorities. As argued by Belanger, there are limits to the ability of the TCG structure to influence the Myanmar leadership. Substantially, the TCG has been most effective merely in resolving procedural and bureaucratic issues, while more sensitive and policy-related issues that require decisions at the leadership level remain difficult. Third, the fact that more significant roles done by other parties, such as aid groups, volunteers, NGOs and civil society groups outside Myanmar.

These parties have been working with many local groups at Myanmar to help Nargis survivors and to rebuild communities and individual lives. Although there were access constraints to the country from the secretive military junta, international NGOs were able to find ways to access affected area and provide vital services. Given that Myanmar had not suffered a worst disaster before, their role has become more important, due to their sufficient resources and experiences in disaster management. However, both ASEAN and Myanmar government have not been fully recognized the importance of civil society groups to be involved in the humanitarian cooperation led by ASEAN. In fact, international NGOs have only been involved indirectly in the TCG through the Humanitarian Coordinator.

Having said that, question then arises whether ASEAN had succeeded or failed to play its major role in managing Nargis disaster. Significantly, being the only mechanism for getting aid and accessing the country, ASEAN had advantage for its close cooperation with Myanmar authorities. While the TCG consists of three representatives each from ASEAN, the UN and Myanmar government, it is considered as less threatening. More over, it is also provided a face-saving way for the Myanmar leadership to accept an international relief operation. Ideally, ASEAN could have achieved a quick outcome of its relief operation in Myanmar. However, the delay prompt actions by the authorities to open humanitarian access had caused suffering to the victims and increased the risk of people’s life. In this context, ASEAN were failed to push Myanmar authorities and convinced them to open humanitarian access right after the cyclone happened. The principle of non interference and the respect for national sovereignty became the underlying factor that contributed to the reluctance of ASEAN in insisting Myanmar authorities. While ASEAN’s actions have been acknowledged as key in providing leadership, structure and legitimacy to the Nargis response, ASEAN was failed to show its major role within the region.

Conclusion
The case of Cyclone Nargis has actually shown that ASEAN approach in responding the disaster was critical in two fronts. On the one hand, it created the opportunity for ASEAN to prove its capabilities to work in humanitarian partnership with the United Nations and exercise its leadership effectively. By using its regional approach emphasized on diplomacy and non confrontative tactic, it became the successful strategy for ensuring relief operation. On the other hand, this approach also demonstrated the weakness of ASEAN for not being able to influence the authorities to immediately open up international access which escalated international pressure and critics, not just to Myanmar government but to ASEAN as well.

Given the fact that the non confrontative approach was derived from its typical ASEAN Way, it is important to look how this factor was taken into account when critics addressed to the slow and cautious approach toward Myanmar government. Speaking about ASEAN Way factor, it is true that one could not ignore that the principle of non interference which is highly regarded within ASEAN has been contributed to ASEAN existence. In the basic level, this principle is become the recognition of national sovereignty of its member. It is more important if we looked back to the historical context of ASEAN establishment, whereas several conflicts happened among its member at the time. According to Severino, all this probably explains the sensitivity of its member to the possibility of outside interference in their internal affairs. The issue of non interference, then, became so important to maintain mutual trust and functional cooperation in ASEAN.

In the case of cyclone Nargis disaster, however, the successful of ASEAN role in leading relief operation would not always likely to be repeated. The humanitarian cooperation that ASEAN worked with the UN could not be seen as a measure of ASEAN’s capacities in strengthening its functional cooperation in disaster management. Moreover, the management of Nargis disaster in Myanmar has actually indicated the limitations of intra-ASEAN cooperation since they still need international support and in managing the disaster within the country. Dealing with member state like Myanmar, which is still internationally criticized on human rights issue, it would be difficult for ASEAN to play its role effectively if the government chose to refuse ASEAN assistance.

In this context, it should be noted that ASEAN functional cooperation in disaster management in such countries will challenge difficulties if ASEAN still apply the same approach whereby the so called ASEAN Way factor remains. Moreover, insisting this principle could not guarantee that ASEAN would always be able to deal with many issues within the region, especially when it related to such fundamental national interest, sovereignty, or territorial disputes. Significantly, the practice of ASEAN Way as an approach of interaction with its member states have many weakness points; timeless decision, non compliance system for disobedience of member states upon ASEAN principles and agreements, the vulnerability of ASEAN role in the region, and the doubt over ASEAN for its lacking power and authority towards its member.

In sum, the case of cyclone Nargis disaster in Myanmar demonstrates how ASEAN faced a dilemma: whether it should support the international pressure toward Myanmar for opened up humanitarian access, or to respect Myanmar government’s action for the sake of ASEAN’s solidarity. Both choices are unbeneficial for ASEAN and have implications for ASEAN. In the future, ASEAN has to realize that there is an urgent need to have an effective regional approach in disaster management, and such regional capacity will be pretty important if ASEAN prefers to maintain its ASEAN Way.


End Notes:
Shaun Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, United States of America, 2002, p.31.
See Humanitarian Appeal, Myanmar Tropical Cyclone Nargis Flash Appeal 2008, Executive Summary, 10 July 2008, http://www.ochaonline.un.org. Accessed on 3/4/2009.
Julie Belanger and Richard Horsey, “Myanmar: A Review”, Humanitarian Exchange, No.41, December 2008, p.2.
See Action Network for Migrants Thailand, Demands Immediate Response By ASEAN For Victims Of Cyclone Nargis In Burma, Media Statement, 18/5/2008, http://www.mapfoundationcnm.org. Accessed on 3/4/2009.
Julie Belanger and Richard Horsey, op.cit.
See ASEAN Charter, Article 1, Purpose No. 9.
See article “ASEAN Has Emerged Stronger after Cyclone Nargis, Rice Crisis”, http://www.topnews.in. Accessed on 3/4/2009.
See http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/VDUX-7N4RV8?OpenDocument
Belanger, op.cit.
Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia In Search of An ASEAN Community, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2006, p.26

THE EVOLVING REGIONAL ORDER AND A QUEST FOR INDONESIA

The evolving international politics after the post-Cold War have shown that the dynamic relations among great powers are significantly characterized by both competitive and cooperative relationship. The transition from the unipolar system after the post-Cold War era become the main reason of this contradictive feature of a new emerging order, in accordance with the re- adjustments of the international order. These adjustments are being a part of the process of the rise and fall of great powers, which is happened because of the change or the shift in the relative distribution of power among those great powers. During this process, we can say that the global order is still in its transitional phase.

At this moment, the power shift in the world are characterized by some tendencies; (1) the continuity of the US hegemony and primacy, (2) the emergence of the rising China, (3) the increasing of Japan’s involvement in the global peace keeping operations, and (3) the emergence of India as potential major power. Nonetheless, it seems that the rise of China become the key driver of this power shift process. As mentioned by Shambaugh, the structures of power and parameters of interactions that have characterized international relations in the Asian region over the last half century are being fundamentally affected by, among other factors, China’s growing economic and military power, rising political influence, distinctive diplomatic voice, and increasing involvement in regional multilateral institutions. Hence, it seems that the characteristic relations among major powers in the next decade might be based on, or responded to the factor of the rising China.

Meanwhile, the increasing role of China in terms of economy and military, have given China a chance to strengthening its diplomatic position and influence within the regions. Thus, it can be a potential cause for a major power shift with all its impact, whether positive or negative impact. As a sole superpower, the US surely would not be relaxed with this situation. Why? It is due to the fact that the main strategic interest of the US in East Asian region –now and then- will be focused on the maintaining of the US hegemony and primacy. Even though the US hegemony still existed, and yet, China still in their long way to go to challenge the US dominance, the phenomenon of the rising China will be the most significant issue to determine the future of the US position, both in the global and regional politics.

The biggest challenge for the US, in my opinion, is how to respond and accommodate the rising power of China, so that China can be a good player and partner to maintain the stability and security in the region, and, at the same time, to contain China from being threatening the US dominance. But it looks like the US still trying to find the right strategy to overcome this situation. Despite the tangible and positive cooperation that China and US have today, there remain evident suspicions and distrust of the other’s motive and action. Thus, we can also see there’s an ambiguity of the US policy toward China, whether they consider China as a “partner”, “strategic competitor”, or even “enemy” of the US. As a result, the state of the US-China relations today may be characterized by David M. Lampton’s term “hedged engagement”, whereby both sides are engaging to a significant extent, yet are hedging against the possibility of a deterioration of ties.

The US practice the hedging strategy in order to maintain mutual economic cooperation with China, while managing the suspicions of China’s motives and actions that may threat the US dominance, and also endanger the regional security. The US hedging strategy is also reflected on the US policy towards its alliances. In the case of Japan, for instance, the US has pushed for Japan to assume a larger role in Asian regional maritime security, increase its defense spending, modernize its forces, and contribute more to international peace keeping. In addition, both countries have already taken strategic steps to strengthening their alliance.
In this emerging and evolving regional order, however, it is still too early and difficult to find out the final form of the transforming process of the regional order. Though the US primacy still remains, the influence of China, and to some extent, the existence of Russia as an ex-superpower, can not be simply abandoned. In the future, the features of new regional dynamics will be more multifaceted, with major powers vying for influence and maintaining their dominance, or even, creating power of balance.

This feature of global politics, however, will be a serious challenge for the Southeast Asian countries, especially for countries with an open and broad territory like Indonesia. The potential security threat, for instance, will always exist. So far, Indonesia –and other ASEAN countries- are relatively successful in preventing regional conflicts among its member. But with the new emerging regional order today, it will create a more challenging situations and threats; the possibility of a condominium powers, or the possibility of major power rivalry that may lead Asian regional states to their worst nightmare where they would be put in the position of having to choose sides.

What Indonesia can do in order to respond this new emerging situation? It is acknowledgeable that Indonesia is not a big power state with high leverage. Therefore, it is important for Indonesia to be realistic in determining its role as a middle power state. In this context, we can look at the prospective situation for Indonesia to increase its role, referring to its membership in the UN and ASEAN. In my opinion, Indonesia can actually play its positive role in the international politics with its membership in the United Nations, and yet, plays its pivotal role in the region through ASEAN, where Indonesia still considered as one of the major state in that regional institution. By being the UN member, Indonesia can endorse ASEAN to be more active in creating peace and security in the region, as expected by the UN Charter. And as a new democratic state, Indonesia has many chances to play its role in the issues related to conflict resolution, peace keeping and peace building.

The human rights issue in Myanmar can be a case of which Indonesia can play a more sustentative role in resolving the Myanmar conflict, since Myanmar’s case has also become one of the UN agenda. Further, as Indonesia known to be the biggest moderate-Moslem state in the world, the issue of terrorism somehow still remains there. Since terrorism seems to be strongly labeled to Islam, it is an important for Indonesia to show how they can overcome this problem correctly. Thus, Indonesia then will be able to position itself as a positive and moderating force in dealing with significant issues related to security and world’s peace keeping issues; human rights, humanitarian crisis, terrorism and clash of civilization, or other non traditional security issues. If Indonesian government keeps increasing their international role, I believe that eventually Indonesia can be a pivotal player within the region.



REFERENCE
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