WOMEN AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION: A COMPARISON BETWEEN INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA

A society that is without the voice and vision of women is not less feminine, it is less human” (Mary Robinson, Ex-President of Republic of Ireland)

Speaking about women’s political representation, the statement from Mary Robinson above implied that a society or a political system can only be said fully democratic if the system listens, considers, and reflects women’s voice and perspectives. Hence, there is no genuine democracy without women’s political representative. In accordance with that, Gesine Fuchs and Beate Hoecker define a political system in which the degree of women’s political representative remains low or under representation, or even without women as merely "a half democracy".

One of the most raised questions is what exactly the significance of having more women in formal politics –or formal institutions? What benefit can a society or political party gain, for instance, if there are more women involved in the decision making process? According to Gesine and Hoecker, there are three main reasons supporting this argument. First, based on the principle of equality and justice. Basically, women and men have equal rights to participate and involve in the decision making process. Therefore, it is unfair to have one sides dominance over others. But in reality, women are always be the one dominated by men, especially for those who lived in a patriarchal value system.

Second, based on the principle of women’s interests. Women’s issues and concerns are naturally different from men. Thus, in order to improve their life quality, they must be involved in the decision making process. Third, based on the principle of emancipation and the change of political process. The argument is that one of the main factors for women’s under representation in formal institutions is due to the strong feature of patriarchal society, that caused unequal position between men and women. Hence, having such values and cultures, the most strategic solution is by encouraging political actions to promote a gender-sensitive society based on equality and justice.

However, it is not that easy to overcome this situation. Many obstacles have been identified that impede women's political participation, including political, economic and socio-cultural barriers. In particular, these include the prevalence of the “masculine model of politics”, a patriarchal culture, the absence of well-developed education and training programmes to support women candidates, and a lack of coordination with public organizations, including women’s groups and organizations. The dual burden of balancing domestic tasks with professional obligations and lack of control over financial resources also impact women’s political participation.

In a country that follows a patriarchal value system, like Indonesia and Malaysia, the chances for women to become politicians or member parliaments, are relatively limited because of society’s perceptions regarding the division of roles between men and women, which tends to be biased towards thinking that a woman’s role should be limited to managing the household. Many feel that both Indonesian and Malaysian society are still male dominated, and men are threatened by the idea of women holding senior posts. In the political sphere, this is compounded by the high premium placed on political power. This makes some men even less willing to share power with women.

In Indonesia, women have always been poorly represented in Indonesian parliaments. Since the first Indonesian election in 1955 up to the 1999 election, the highest percentage of women in national parliament was only 13 percent (the 1987-1992 period). In the lead-up to the 2004 election the demand from women activists to increase women’s representation in parliament was very strong. In the next general election 2009, this demand was finally accommodated through the amandments of UU Partai Politik No.2/2008 and UU Pemilu No.10/2008 that urged the implementation of quota system within the party.

Arguably, women constituted more than half of the 260 million Indonesia’s population. Therefore, based on the principle of justice, the number of women in the parliament should not be lower than the number of men’s representation. But in practice, women’s representation in the parliaments –at various level- is still remain low, due to a range obstacles limiting their progress. The selection process within political parties which is still dominated by men candidates, for instance, become one of the most classical problems challenged by women. Nevertheless, a recent progress has been made through the affirmative action policy, whereby party ought to fulfill the 30 percent minimum quota for its women candidates. However, this policy still lacking implementation because there are no compliance system for the ignorance of the policy.

The following table here demonstrates the level of women’s representation in the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (National Parliament) from 1999-2004. The table below shows that the number of women’s representation is still low comparing to men’s representation. In general election 1999, women’s representation even reached its lowest level (only 9 percent) since the national election held in 1987. In 2004, this number have increased, but again, is still far from satisfactory.

Table 1: Women Members of National Parliament in Indonesia from 1955 to 2004

Election Year	1955	1959	1971	1977	1982	1987	1992	1997	1999	2004
Total Parliamentary Seat	289	513	496	489	499	565	565	554	545	550
Women MP’s	17	25	36	29	39	65	65	54	45	61
%	6.30	5.10	7.80	6.30	9.50	13.00	12.50	10.80	9.00	11.09

Source: Panduan Calon Legislatif Perempuan Untuk Pemilu 2009, Jakarta: Penerbit PUSKAPOL FISIP UI dan The Asia Foundation, 2008.

Comparing to Indonesia, the situation of women’s representation in Malaysia is not so different. Eventhough women constitute over 50 percent of Malaysia’s 23 million population, Malaysian women still find themselves under-representated in political institutions. According to Rashila and Saliha, there are at least five common factors which form obstacles to Malaysian women’s active participation in politics. They classify the factors as, social discrimination against women’s roles in the public domain, time constraints due to career and domestic demands, cultural and religious arguments that a woman’s place is in the home, structural constraints within each political party that do not allow women to advance beyond a certain level, and lack of adequate resources in terms of organizational support, personal influence and finance.

Based on UNESCAP report of Malaysian women’s political participation, the increase in the number of women standing for elections, both in the Federal and State, has been slow although women make up almost half of the population. It took 40 years for women’s representation at the Federal Legislative Assembly (the Lower House of Parliament) to increase from about 2.9 per cent (only 3 women) in 1957 to 10.9 per cent in the 1999 election. The appointment of women as ministers remained almost constant at 2 over the last 3 elections in the 1990s.

In 2002, Malaysia had three women in full ministerial positions: the Minister of Women and Family Development, the Minister of International Trade and Industry and the Minister of Welfare and National Unity. In addition, women occupy other significant governmental posts that include deputy ministers, political secretaries, diplomats, senior civil servants, elected members of various state assemblies, and senators in the Dewan Negara (The Senate). In the Dewan Rakyat (The House of Reprentatives), there are now 20 women members of parliament, out of 193 total members. If the number of elected women MPs is an indicator, there has been a slow improvement in the status and position of women in Malaysian politics.

Table 2: Women Members of Parliament in Malaysia from 1955 to 1999

Election Year	1955	1959	1964	1969	1974	1978	1982	1986	1990	1995	1999
Total Parliamentary Seat	52	104	104	144	154	154	154	177	180	192	193
Women MP’s	1	3	3	2	5	7	8	7	11	15	20
%	2.00	2.90	2.90	1.38	3.25	4.54	5.19	3.95	6.11	7.80	10.36

Source: Rashila Ramli. "Modernisasi Politik: Ke Arah Keseimbangan Gender dalam Penyertaan Politik?” In Abdul Rahman Embong (ed.), Negara, Pasaran dan Pemodenan Malaysia. Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2000.

However, if we look at the number of women’s member in political parties which increased today, it implies that women’s political participation in Malaysia is having slight progress. According to Hegemann, Malaysian women today have more opportunity and places within the parties. In UMNO party, for instance, there are now more than 50 percent women’s member. Similar progress can be seen in Justice Party, the opposition party, led by women’s leader named Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, who is also the wife of Anwar Ibrahim –the former deputy prime minister of Malaysia. Unfortunately, different situation found in PAS party, where women still facing difficulties to obtain positions within the party due to strong traditional Islamic orientation. Thus, women in PAS are always discriminated and forbidded to have major positions. But overall, despite this increasing participation, only few of them can reach top positions within the parties, whereas the majority are still held by men.

Having shows the comparison between these countries, we can say that there are similarities between women in Indonesia and Malaysia, in terms of their struggle entering political arena. The main challenge is of course those related to socio-cultural barriers. It is not easy to change the existing values within the society. In this case, Indonesia and Malaysia’s society are strongly characterized by the patriarchal values, structures, and attitude, which then permeated political life. Thus, it led them gaining less support from their families and societies when they enter politics, because people still think of politics as a “domain of men, hard, dirty, full of intrigue, and simply wasting money. Despite this fundamental barrier, there are still numerous problems related to political barriers, which also not easy for women to overcome. Lacking party support, limited access to political and social networks, lack of education, and the nature of electoral system which not be favorable to women candidates, are only few lists to mentioned. There are still much more to list to identify the obstacles that women facing in empowering their political participation, and thus, their representation in political institutions.

The next question is, what can be done to improve this situation? Basically, there are at least two main strategies. First, through cultural approach by slowly reducing the existing patriarchal ideology in every aspects of traditional culture. Second, through structural approach by amending the rules and policies which are still discriminative towards women. In practice, we have to admit that it is not easy to exert these approachments at the same time. Hence, it would be more realistic to choose the prior approachment with a more significant impact and achievable in a short term.

One of the most effective structural approach is by implementing quota system (affirmative action) for bringing about change within the parliamentary system. The adoption of these affirmative action measures has opened doors for socially disadvantaged and marginalized groups that otherwise had limited access to decision-making bodies. However, it must be stressed that the quota system is not enough, because its implementation varies significantly from country to country. The effect of quotas to a large extent depends upon the adherence of political parties and to the firmness of the enforcement mechanisms. If the number of women nominated is small and dependent on the total number of “places” provided for them on party tickets, their numbers will continue to lag behind men. Besides that, affirmative action must be understood as a temporary action, and only implemented to improve the gender disparities in political institutions. Eventhough it may seems not democratic, but this affirmative action is also arguable.

The principle of equality in democracy is also requires a just situation in every aspect; equal opportunity, access, and resources. The problems faced by women when they enter politics, however, do not meet that criteria. Women and men are still positioned unequal, thus, there are several obstacles for women entering political arena. This is why affirmative action become a strategic and necessary action in order to fulfill the quantity of women’s representation as required by democratic system.

Further, in order to increase the quality of women’s representation, women candidates ought to improve their knowledge and political skill. They also have to provide themselves with strategic plans so that they can compete well for campaign. By having these criteria, the opportunity for women to become politicians, and thus, to increase women’s representation, will be more opened. In order to gain more support from society, women candidates must also strengthen links between women’s network and organizations. This link will helps women candidates to build-up strategic issues, organizing and determining strategic campaigns. In doing so, women’s organizations can provide them with a support base in the form of training and in developing skills, in building confidence and in developing a knowledge base that will enable them to create gender sensitive legislation. Women’s organizations may also provide advisory and financial support during campaigns, and increase the visibility and legitimacy of candidates by stressing gender issues and improving gender awareness.

In the end, eventhough the struggle to increase women’s representation is indeed a long journey toward the goal of achieving gender equality, steps forward must be taken continuously and consistently. Further works remain to be done, and only by doing so, women can overcome whatever the adversities and obstacles placed in their paths.

REFERENCES

1. Ani Soetjipto, “Politik dan Perempuan”, dalam PUSKAPOL FISIP UI, Panduan Calon Anggota Legislatif Perempuan Untuk Pemilu 2009, Jakarta: PUSKAPOL dan The Asia Foundation, 2008.
2. CETRO (Centre For Electoral Reform).. “Data dan Fakta Keterwakilan Perempuan Indonesia di Partai Politik dan Lembaga Legislatif 1999-2001” (unpublished). Jakarta: Divisi Perempuan dan Pemilu. 8 Maret, 2002.
3. Hurriyah, “Rekonstruksi Wacana Perempuan dan Politik”, dalam Danang Akbarona (et.all), Agar Reformasi Tak Mati Suri : Suara-Suara Mahasiswa Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta: Pustaka Nauka, 2004.
4. Hurriyah, “Strategi Menyiapkan Kampanye Pemilu”, dalam PUSKAPOL FISIP UI, Panduan Calon Anggota Legislatif Perempuan Untuk Pemilu 2009, Jakarta: PUSKAPOL dan The Asia Foundation, 2008.
5. IDEA, Perempuan di Parlemen: Bukan Sekedar Jumlah, Stockholm: International IDEA, 2002.
6. Inter-Parliamentary Union. Women in National Parliaments. February 2002. http://www.ipu.org
7. Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. “Cultural Barriers to Women’s Leadership: A Worldwide Comparison,” unpublished paper, 2000.
8. Peran Politik Perempuan di Malaysia, Pakistan dan Indonesia, 7 Mei 2008, http://www.dw-world.de.
9. PUSKAPOL FISIP UI, Laporan Kajian Revisi Undang-Undang Pemilu Dan Partai Politik Serta Implikasinya Bagi Keterwakilan Perempuan Di Parlemen, (unpublished) Jakarta: PUSKAPOL dan Partnership, April 2007.
10. UNESCAP, Report On The State of Women in Urban Local Government in Malaysia, http://www.unescap.org
11. Wahidah Zein Br Siregar. “Women and the Failure to Achieve the 30 Per Cent Quota in the 2004-2009 Indonesian Parliaments: The Role of the Electoral System,” Paper Presented at the 20th IPSA World Congress, Fukuoka, 9-13 July 2006, http://www,.ipsa-rc19.anu.edu.au
12. Women’s Aid Organization, Women’s Equality in Malaysia, Status Report 2001, http://www.wao.org.my

How you define rules and norms?

Say the truth although it hurts.

Seperti kata hadist: jika melihat kemungkaran,ubah dg tanganmu, suaramu, atau setidak2nya dg hatimu –walaupun menunjukkan selemah-lemahnya iman kita. Tapi sungguh, saya percaya bahwa hadist itu menjelaskan pada kita betapa pentingnya bersikap terhadap kebenaran. I do believe.

Bukan kebenaran versi kita yang bisa jadi bersifat sangat subjektif, apalagi kebenaran yang bisa dibantah-bantahkan. Kebenaran yang saya maksudkan disini, adalah kebenaran yang sudah diyakini berdasarkan hukum. Entah itu hukum positif dalam negara yang selayaknya kita patuhi sebagai warga negara, atau hukum agama yang sudah pasti wajib kita patuhi sebagai orang yang beragama. State’s rules. Family’s rules. Religion’s rules. Any rules. For example, apa yang diperbolehkan menurut agama, dari dulu sampai sekarang, hukumnya akan tetap boleh, halal. Begitu juga sebaliknya, vice versa.

The world may change, people can change, but as long as people live there will always be norms and rules that they must obey. People are ruled by these norms, even when we are now live in the digital era, a borderless world, virtual world. Era internet yang mungkin masih ada banyak orang yg berfikir bahwa itu hanya dunia maya, dunia yang terpisah dari kehidupan kita. A place where you can play as Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, Janus bermuka dua, bipolar character, or playing any of your alters.

Come on people, it doesn’t work that way. You can’t be that naïve to think that way. Even in the digital era where people can easily interact without any border, borderless world they say, there are some rules that must be obey. Norms, so to say. Once you start thinking that you can simply put aside these norms or simplify them for the sake of global trends, and defend yourself for being a 'trend follower' and follow what others do, and you think that it is safe to be like that, perhaps you should just leave all the norms you believe in your real life.

They are not different, not at all. If you believe that in the real life you are ruled by these norms and obey them, then why can’t those norms applied on you in your virtual life? To simply take example, if you obey the State’s rule for not doing crime, will it be different if you do it in your virtual life –through the medium of internet? If you can be pursued and arrested by doing a terror to other people, do you think you are free to do that in the internet?

Hahah! If things can be simply separated like that, then Prita’s case in Indonesia should not have happened. Another example, if as a moslem you are forbidden to kiss someone who is not your muhrim, what makes you think you can do it in the internet? Of course, kissing a person through the internet won’t be the same as if you kiss him/her directly. No need to argue about it :-)

The above examples can be extended in any forms. But hey, my point is, you are what you say. You are what you do. You are what you mean to say and do. It’s not about the trend, it’s not about a borderless interaction, and it’s not about how cool or cute it may look like to follow trends. There are no justifications accepted for such things. If you, for example, send a hug to someone else through the internet, say facebook for example, is it wrong if people think that you are mean with it?

I’m not debating on whether it’s a friendship hug or cutie bear hug or even, worse than that, a special hug for someone opposite your gender. And tell me, anyone, is it wrong if you think –no matter who you are, your background, your educational level, your physical look, or even your circle of friendship - that the hug is not acceptable according to the norms that you believe? Especially if the norms are derived from religion. They are Omni presence, berlaku dimana saja, baik di dunia nyata ataupun di dunia maya. Aturan-Nya menembus batas dan zona tempat dan waktu, dan itu berlaku buat semua orang yang percaya pada-Nya, meyakini aturan-Nya.

So don’t say it’s nothing or meaningless. No one would believe that. People would feel happy to receive a friendly messages or hugs from their friends, coz they are symbols. And every symbol has a meaning. A kiss, hugs, smiles, pokes, words, pictures, whatsoever. And, if for example, someone feels irritated or jealous because of things you send to his/her loved one although they are only pictures, or words, or virtual hug or kiss or whatsoever, do you think he/she is just being over reactive? Lebay? Gee….so what’s the point of sending flowers for your loved one as a symbol of love, for example? Why bother sending messages or cards or emails to your friends or families or colleagues in their special day or in any occasion? Nonsense.

Menurut anda ucapan saya berlebihan? Masih tidak percaya bahwa aturan dalam dunia maya dan dunia nyata tidak sama? Let me give you another example about how positive rule can be applied on virtual world, dunia internet. Shannon D Jackson, a woman in a city named Hendersonville, are arrested just because she poke one of her friend in her FB, while she was told by the court to stay away from that person she poked in FB. She was then arrested with an accusation of breaking the law. The case is real, my friend. Just goggling and find the news if you don’t trust me.

In the end, I can only say be careful with what you do or say in internet, in FB, in any of social networking websites or blogs. Even if you think it’s nothing, it can be something for someone else. What you think is only trends, can be considered as inappropriate according to the norms for someone else. You can’t blame people for being different, to think different.


Jakarta, February 13, 2010

ASEAN’S ROLE IN RESPONDING CYCLONE NARGIS DISASTER : A REVIEW ON ASEAN WAY

Introduction
In its 42 years old, The Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) is now acknowledged to be the most successful and durable regional cooperation in Asia and Pacific. One of the fundamental components supported the success and the existence of this organization, argues by Shaun Narine, is its pattern of diplomacy -further to be known as the “ASEAN Way”. Historically, ASEAN has developed the ASEAN Way based on the great diversities among its member, and also the motivation to create a stable intramural environment. In this context, conflicts are dealt with by postponing difficult issues, compartmentalizing an issue so that it does not interfere with other areas of cooperation, and quiet diplomacy. This is how ASEAN Way defined and used by ASEAN to achieve this goal center and indirect approaches to conflictual situations. Furthermore, the ASEAN Way has been embedded in the way ASEAN manage problems and develop its area of cooperation.

Despite its contribution to the successfulness of ASEAN, however, critics and doubts over ASEAN Way has been addressed to this organization due to its impact on the slow-cautious approach and loose arrangements that ASEAN always use when dealing with problems or issues. The cyclone Nargis that strucked Myanmar in 2008, to certain extent, has emerged critics and doubts over ASEAN’s role in responding this problem. At least there are two main opinion here: first, those who viewed that ASEAN had succeeded in negotiating and ensuring humanitarian access to cyclone-affected areas in the country, and second, those who viewed it as a failure of ASEAN to taken part effectively in the Nargis disaster. The argument is clear: despite the fact that Myanmar is a member of ASEAN, however, ASEAN could not force the government to open the country for international assistance for the reason of distrust of external interference.

Having said that, this paper will examine the role of ASEAN in responding cyclone Nargis disaster which strucked Myanmar in 2008. The paper will be focusing on the relevance and the effectiveness of ASEAN Way which entrenched in the way ASEAN dealing with Nargis disaster. As a part of ASEAN functional cooperation in disaster management, it is important to look at ASEAN’s response in this matter, since natural disaster such as Cyclone Nargis are likely to become increasingly frequent, and expertise in responding to and managing them will be needed in the future.

ASEAN’s Role on Nargis Disaster : A Test For ASEAN?
The cyclone Nargis that strucked Myanmar on 2 and 3 May 2008 has caused widespread devastation in the Ayeyarwady and Yangon Divisions. Based on the Humanitarian Appeal report, the scale of human loss and suffering was vast. The latest official figures reported that nearly 140,000 persons are either dead or “missing” (more precisely 84,537 killed, 53,836 still unaccounted for); and nearly 20,000 have been injured. Some 2.4 million people are thought to be severely affected (in the sense of loss of livelihoods, shelter, or similarly severe loss) – equivalent to more than a third of the population of 7.3 million in the affected Townships – with up to 800,000 people displaced from their homes.

Nargis was the worst natural disaster in the history of Myanmar, and possibly the most devastating cyclone to hit Asia since the cyclone that struck Bangladesh in 1991. The impact on the Ayeyarwady Delta -a remote area, heavily populated and difficult to access-, was particularly severe. In addition to the lives and livelihoods lost, the timing and extent of the natural disaster greatly affected the critical planting season in what is Myanmar’s breadbasket region, with significant quantities of seeds and harvested crops lost.

The cyclone Nargis disaster had also brought more critics to Myanmar government, which considered failed to provide prompt and immediate response to the victims of cyclone Nargis and the tidal surge. As noted by Belanger and Horsey, before the cyclone struck, the interim UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator made a formal offer of assistance to the Myanmar authorities, underlining that there would be a need for immediate access to any affected areas in order to undertake an assessment of needs. The Myanmar authorities indicated informally as early as 4 May that they would be open to international assistance, and this position was formalized in a briefing to the UN and diplomats on 5 May.

However, at that point the emphasis was clearly on support to the national response through bilateral channels, rather than any form of international relief operation. There were no immediate steps were taken by the authorities to facilitate the issuing of visas for international humanitarian staff, or to relax the cumbersome procedures governing travel by internationals outside of Yangon. Even though the international community did immediately offer assistance to people of Burma, the Myanmar government has generally denied access to open the country and let foreign aid and assistance in helping the victims. The junta refused to issue visas for emergency relief workers, and this has impeded the flow of aid into the country to the victims of the calamity. In brief, one can say that Myanmar authorities were initially reluctant to provide the necessary access to international humanitarian agencies.

According to Belanger, there are four factors that are likely contributed to the reluctance of Myanmar government. First, the self reliance doctrine, whereby the government reinforced the doctrine that the country and its people must take care of themselves and eschew any kind of outside assistance. Second, limited familiarity with international disaster response, whereby the Myanmar government at various level, were unfamiliar with what an international response entailed. Third, the domestic political context. This factor refers to the fact that in the wake of the cyclone, Myanmar government was focused more on political and security concerns. Fourth, the international environment, whereby the senior leadership is also suspicious of the motives behind international humanitarian assistance, which it tends to view as an instrument used by the West in pursuit of its political agenda.

In addition, such critics were also addressed to ASEAN, as an organization in which Myanmar become a member state. Action Network for Migrants Thailand, for instance, through their media statement declared that ASEAN has failed to do enough to effectively fulfill its responsibility to the people of ASEAN and the victims of this natural disaster in the Irrawaddy delta. Being the body of governments representing the people of ASEAN, it has the duty and responsibility to protect lives and “the high quality of life of its people”, as stated in its charter. Thus, ASEAN has responsibility to protect people’s life in the region, including Burmese people in Myanmar. Although ASEAN has in the past been strongly criticized for its position on and relationship with Myanmar -in particular for its policies of ‘non-interference’ and ‘constructive engagement’, the cyclone Nargis had became a test for ASEAN to answer the doubts over ASEAN’s effective role in the region. Hence, in the sense that ASEAN has responsibility to protect lives, it is also responsible for the loss of life and the additional sufferings brought about by the actions of Myanmar government that prevented necessary aid and assistant reaching the victims of cyclone Nargis.

On the contrary, the Secretary General of ASEAN, Surin Pitsuwan, claimed that the cyclone Nargis that whipped Myanmar has made ASEAN stronger, and gave the grouping "a sense of community and confidence". Referring to the successfulness of ASEAN in leading the international humanitarian effort to help millions of cyclone victims, he argues that it was actually shown to the world that ASEAN is an effective organization. Moreover, Pitsuwan insisted that in responding to the cyclone Nargis disaster management, ASEAN became the only mechanism for getting aid to the worst-hit areas.

The significance of ASEAN’s role in Nargis disaster, as claimed by Pitsuwan, was referring to ASEAN quick response in providing necessary assistance. Just after the cyclone struck, Pitsuwan called on all member states to provide urgent relief assistance through the framework of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). Three days later, on 8 May, the Myanmar government agreed to work in coordination with the ASEAN Secretariat to assemble and deploy an ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT), made up of government officials, disaster management experts and NGOs from member countries. In the first-ever such mission for ASEAN, ERAT was deployed to Myanmar from 9–18 May. Its report was submitted to a Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 19 May. At the meeting, ministers agreed to establish an ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism to 'facilitate the effective distribution and utilization of assistance from the international community, including the expeditious and effective deployment of relief workers, especially health and medical personnel'. Furthermore, ASEAN has also established two-tiered structure, consisting of a diplomatic body, the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force (AHTF), and a Yangon-based Tripartite Core Group (TCG), consisting of ASEAN, the Myanmar government and the United Nations, to facilitate day-to-day operations. Besides, a sense of community and solidarity also shown by the prompt action from rice exporting countries in ASEAN when they provided rice for the victims in affected area of cyclone Nargis through the coordination of ASEAN. Hence, Pitsuwan insisted that it actually shown how ASEAN did responsive action over the cyclone Nargis disaster.

Nonetheless, it is difficult to say with certainty whether ASEAN was indeed reached successful role in leading relief assistance in Myanmar. The fact that there are numerous critics remain might raise question and doubts over ASEAN’s effective role in this matter.

Success or Failure?
Although the important role of ASEAN in responding the cyclone Nargis disaster is to be recognized, however, a number of important points are worth noting. First, the deployment of ASEAN-ERAT to Myanmar, under the ASEAN Standby Arrangements and Standard Operating Procedure (SASOP) for disaster emergency response operations, was the first-ever experience for ASEAN. Thus, the lack of experience became a test for ASEAN’s capacity in cyclone Nargis disaster management. Second, the TCG was also challenging difficulties in dealing with Myanmar authorities. As argued by Belanger, there are limits to the ability of the TCG structure to influence the Myanmar leadership. Substantially, the TCG has been most effective merely in resolving procedural and bureaucratic issues, while more sensitive and policy-related issues that require decisions at the leadership level remain difficult. Third, the fact that more significant roles done by other parties, such as aid groups, volunteers, NGOs and civil society groups outside Myanmar.

These parties have been working with many local groups at Myanmar to help Nargis survivors and to rebuild communities and individual lives. Although there were access constraints to the country from the secretive military junta, international NGOs were able to find ways to access affected area and provide vital services. Given that Myanmar had not suffered a worst disaster before, their role has become more important, due to their sufficient resources and experiences in disaster management. However, both ASEAN and Myanmar government have not been fully recognized the importance of civil society groups to be involved in the humanitarian cooperation led by ASEAN. In fact, international NGOs have only been involved indirectly in the TCG through the Humanitarian Coordinator.

Having said that, question then arises whether ASEAN had succeeded or failed to play its major role in managing Nargis disaster. Significantly, being the only mechanism for getting aid and accessing the country, ASEAN had advantage for its close cooperation with Myanmar authorities. While the TCG consists of three representatives each from ASEAN, the UN and Myanmar government, it is considered as less threatening. More over, it is also provided a face-saving way for the Myanmar leadership to accept an international relief operation. Ideally, ASEAN could have achieved a quick outcome of its relief operation in Myanmar. However, the delay prompt actions by the authorities to open humanitarian access had caused suffering to the victims and increased the risk of people’s life. In this context, ASEAN were failed to push Myanmar authorities and convinced them to open humanitarian access right after the cyclone happened. The principle of non interference and the respect for national sovereignty became the underlying factor that contributed to the reluctance of ASEAN in insisting Myanmar authorities. While ASEAN’s actions have been acknowledged as key in providing leadership, structure and legitimacy to the Nargis response, ASEAN was failed to show its major role within the region.

Conclusion
The case of Cyclone Nargis has actually shown that ASEAN approach in responding the disaster was critical in two fronts. On the one hand, it created the opportunity for ASEAN to prove its capabilities to work in humanitarian partnership with the United Nations and exercise its leadership effectively. By using its regional approach emphasized on diplomacy and non confrontative tactic, it became the successful strategy for ensuring relief operation. On the other hand, this approach also demonstrated the weakness of ASEAN for not being able to influence the authorities to immediately open up international access which escalated international pressure and critics, not just to Myanmar government but to ASEAN as well.

Given the fact that the non confrontative approach was derived from its typical ASEAN Way, it is important to look how this factor was taken into account when critics addressed to the slow and cautious approach toward Myanmar government. Speaking about ASEAN Way factor, it is true that one could not ignore that the principle of non interference which is highly regarded within ASEAN has been contributed to ASEAN existence. In the basic level, this principle is become the recognition of national sovereignty of its member. It is more important if we looked back to the historical context of ASEAN establishment, whereas several conflicts happened among its member at the time. According to Severino, all this probably explains the sensitivity of its member to the possibility of outside interference in their internal affairs. The issue of non interference, then, became so important to maintain mutual trust and functional cooperation in ASEAN.

In the case of cyclone Nargis disaster, however, the successful of ASEAN role in leading relief operation would not always likely to be repeated. The humanitarian cooperation that ASEAN worked with the UN could not be seen as a measure of ASEAN’s capacities in strengthening its functional cooperation in disaster management. Moreover, the management of Nargis disaster in Myanmar has actually indicated the limitations of intra-ASEAN cooperation since they still need international support and in managing the disaster within the country. Dealing with member state like Myanmar, which is still internationally criticized on human rights issue, it would be difficult for ASEAN to play its role effectively if the government chose to refuse ASEAN assistance.

In this context, it should be noted that ASEAN functional cooperation in disaster management in such countries will challenge difficulties if ASEAN still apply the same approach whereby the so called ASEAN Way factor remains. Moreover, insisting this principle could not guarantee that ASEAN would always be able to deal with many issues within the region, especially when it related to such fundamental national interest, sovereignty, or territorial disputes. Significantly, the practice of ASEAN Way as an approach of interaction with its member states have many weakness points; timeless decision, non compliance system for disobedience of member states upon ASEAN principles and agreements, the vulnerability of ASEAN role in the region, and the doubt over ASEAN for its lacking power and authority towards its member.

In sum, the case of cyclone Nargis disaster in Myanmar demonstrates how ASEAN faced a dilemma: whether it should support the international pressure toward Myanmar for opened up humanitarian access, or to respect Myanmar government’s action for the sake of ASEAN’s solidarity. Both choices are unbeneficial for ASEAN and have implications for ASEAN. In the future, ASEAN has to realize that there is an urgent need to have an effective regional approach in disaster management, and such regional capacity will be pretty important if ASEAN prefers to maintain its ASEAN Way.


End Notes:
Shaun Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, United States of America, 2002, p.31.
See Humanitarian Appeal, Myanmar Tropical Cyclone Nargis Flash Appeal 2008, Executive Summary, 10 July 2008, http://www.ochaonline.un.org. Accessed on 3/4/2009.
Julie Belanger and Richard Horsey, “Myanmar: A Review”, Humanitarian Exchange, No.41, December 2008, p.2.
See Action Network for Migrants Thailand, Demands Immediate Response By ASEAN For Victims Of Cyclone Nargis In Burma, Media Statement, 18/5/2008, http://www.mapfoundationcnm.org. Accessed on 3/4/2009.
Julie Belanger and Richard Horsey, op.cit.
See ASEAN Charter, Article 1, Purpose No. 9.
See article “ASEAN Has Emerged Stronger after Cyclone Nargis, Rice Crisis”, http://www.topnews.in. Accessed on 3/4/2009.
See http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/VDUX-7N4RV8?OpenDocument
Belanger, op.cit.
Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia In Search of An ASEAN Community, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2006, p.26

THE EVOLVING REGIONAL ORDER AND A QUEST FOR INDONESIA

The evolving international politics after the post-Cold War have shown that the dynamic relations among great powers are significantly characterized by both competitive and cooperative relationship. The transition from the unipolar system after the post-Cold War era become the main reason of this contradictive feature of a new emerging order, in accordance with the re- adjustments of the international order. These adjustments are being a part of the process of the rise and fall of great powers, which is happened because of the change or the shift in the relative distribution of power among those great powers. During this process, we can say that the global order is still in its transitional phase.

At this moment, the power shift in the world are characterized by some tendencies; (1) the continuity of the US hegemony and primacy, (2) the emergence of the rising China, (3) the increasing of Japan’s involvement in the global peace keeping operations, and (3) the emergence of India as potential major power. Nonetheless, it seems that the rise of China become the key driver of this power shift process. As mentioned by Shambaugh, the structures of power and parameters of interactions that have characterized international relations in the Asian region over the last half century are being fundamentally affected by, among other factors, China’s growing economic and military power, rising political influence, distinctive diplomatic voice, and increasing involvement in regional multilateral institutions. Hence, it seems that the characteristic relations among major powers in the next decade might be based on, or responded to the factor of the rising China.

Meanwhile, the increasing role of China in terms of economy and military, have given China a chance to strengthening its diplomatic position and influence within the regions. Thus, it can be a potential cause for a major power shift with all its impact, whether positive or negative impact. As a sole superpower, the US surely would not be relaxed with this situation. Why? It is due to the fact that the main strategic interest of the US in East Asian region –now and then- will be focused on the maintaining of the US hegemony and primacy. Even though the US hegemony still existed, and yet, China still in their long way to go to challenge the US dominance, the phenomenon of the rising China will be the most significant issue to determine the future of the US position, both in the global and regional politics.

The biggest challenge for the US, in my opinion, is how to respond and accommodate the rising power of China, so that China can be a good player and partner to maintain the stability and security in the region, and, at the same time, to contain China from being threatening the US dominance. But it looks like the US still trying to find the right strategy to overcome this situation. Despite the tangible and positive cooperation that China and US have today, there remain evident suspicions and distrust of the other’s motive and action. Thus, we can also see there’s an ambiguity of the US policy toward China, whether they consider China as a “partner”, “strategic competitor”, or even “enemy” of the US. As a result, the state of the US-China relations today may be characterized by David M. Lampton’s term “hedged engagement”, whereby both sides are engaging to a significant extent, yet are hedging against the possibility of a deterioration of ties.

The US practice the hedging strategy in order to maintain mutual economic cooperation with China, while managing the suspicions of China’s motives and actions that may threat the US dominance, and also endanger the regional security. The US hedging strategy is also reflected on the US policy towards its alliances. In the case of Japan, for instance, the US has pushed for Japan to assume a larger role in Asian regional maritime security, increase its defense spending, modernize its forces, and contribute more to international peace keeping. In addition, both countries have already taken strategic steps to strengthening their alliance.
In this emerging and evolving regional order, however, it is still too early and difficult to find out the final form of the transforming process of the regional order. Though the US primacy still remains, the influence of China, and to some extent, the existence of Russia as an ex-superpower, can not be simply abandoned. In the future, the features of new regional dynamics will be more multifaceted, with major powers vying for influence and maintaining their dominance, or even, creating power of balance.

This feature of global politics, however, will be a serious challenge for the Southeast Asian countries, especially for countries with an open and broad territory like Indonesia. The potential security threat, for instance, will always exist. So far, Indonesia –and other ASEAN countries- are relatively successful in preventing regional conflicts among its member. But with the new emerging regional order today, it will create a more challenging situations and threats; the possibility of a condominium powers, or the possibility of major power rivalry that may lead Asian regional states to their worst nightmare where they would be put in the position of having to choose sides.

What Indonesia can do in order to respond this new emerging situation? It is acknowledgeable that Indonesia is not a big power state with high leverage. Therefore, it is important for Indonesia to be realistic in determining its role as a middle power state. In this context, we can look at the prospective situation for Indonesia to increase its role, referring to its membership in the UN and ASEAN. In my opinion, Indonesia can actually play its positive role in the international politics with its membership in the United Nations, and yet, plays its pivotal role in the region through ASEAN, where Indonesia still considered as one of the major state in that regional institution. By being the UN member, Indonesia can endorse ASEAN to be more active in creating peace and security in the region, as expected by the UN Charter. And as a new democratic state, Indonesia has many chances to play its role in the issues related to conflict resolution, peace keeping and peace building.

The human rights issue in Myanmar can be a case of which Indonesia can play a more sustentative role in resolving the Myanmar conflict, since Myanmar’s case has also become one of the UN agenda. Further, as Indonesia known to be the biggest moderate-Moslem state in the world, the issue of terrorism somehow still remains there. Since terrorism seems to be strongly labeled to Islam, it is an important for Indonesia to show how they can overcome this problem correctly. Thus, Indonesia then will be able to position itself as a positive and moderating force in dealing with significant issues related to security and world’s peace keeping issues; human rights, humanitarian crisis, terrorism and clash of civilization, or other non traditional security issues. If Indonesian government keeps increasing their international role, I believe that eventually Indonesia can be a pivotal player within the region.



REFERENCE
David Shambaugh, “Asia in Transition: The Evolving Regional Order,” Current History, April 2006
David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005
Evan S. Medeiros, "Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability," Washington Quarterly, Vol 29, No. 1, Winter 2005-2006
Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia,” International Security Vol. 32, No. 3, Winter 2007/08
John David Ciorciari, “The Balance of Great-Power Influence in Contemporary Southeast Asia,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Vol. 9, 2009
T.V. Paul, et al., eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, Stanford: Stanford University, 2004